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Abstract
This paper investigates the causes of the disproportionate increases
of sovereign yields with respect to the interest rate on the 10 years
German Bund within the Eurozone. Empirical evidence drawn from
banks’ portfolios shows that rapid financial integration following the
launch of the monetary union resulted in excess exposure of Core
countries’ banks in the Peripheral countries’ financial assets, which
exposed the network of highly interconnected European banks to a
systemic risk. Data show that after the outbreak of the financial crisis
the Core banks’ portfolio diversification towards the Periphery was re-
versed by the “flight to quality”. Estimates conducted by our GVAR
model, where each country’s spread depends upon all Eurozone coun-
tries’ spreads, indicate that the rise in the Core countries’ spreads was
initially determined by the rising international risk aversion, whereas
the huge rise in the sovereign yields of Peripheral countries is corre-
lated to their macroeconomic fundamentals, namely the public debt
/ GDP ratio and REER values increasing with respect to the Euro-
zone average index. Our results also validate the hypothesis that a
contagion developed from the Periphery’s to the Core countries’ inter-
est rate differentials vis-a`-vis Germany. The rise of the Core spreads
has to be traced back to mounting expectations in the markets of
an enduring financial instability within the Eurozone, associated with
possible defaults in the Periphery.
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1 Introduction
After the adoption of the euro and the end of the exchange rate risk,
a rapid financial integration process developed in Europe, even more
impressive than the 1990s unprecedented jump in worldwide capital
movements. We provide evidence that a huge portfolio diversifica-
tion was operated by highly interconnected banks, mainly consisting
of large positions taken by the banks of the Core1 countries in the
sovereign bonds of the Peripheral2 countries.
The balance between pros and cons of diversification is difficult
to assess (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986; Stiglitz, 2010)3. On the one
hand, portfolio diversification puts forward the fractionalisation of risk
across a larger number of investors, which favours the shrinking of the
default risk premium on sovereign bonds. On the other hand, excessive
interconnectivity across financial institutions can make markets more
volatile. The risk of a systemic crisis can then materialize among the
countries involved in a financial integration. The more the portfolios
had been diversified through cross-border operations, the higher the
risk that a large shock could develop a contagion across the yields of
Eurozone countries’ sovereign bonds.
This paper investigates the causes of the varying distance between
the interest rate on the 10-year bonds of Eurozone countries and the
interest rate on the German 10-year Bund. The econometric model
takes account of the huge increase in cross-border investments which
after the launch of the euro magnified the interconnectivity across Eu-
ropean banks, resulting in excess exposure of Core countries’ banks
in the Peripheral countries’ financial assets. A perverse interaction
developed during the financial crisis between the expected returns of
the banks turning negative and the heterogeneous degree of riskiness
1Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, German and the Netherland.
2Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
3“Whether greater interconnectivity is net positive or negative thus depends on whether
the first set of effects, the diversification benefits, outweighs the second, the contagion
costs. That depends both on the degree of risk aversion, the concavity of production
functions (the extent to which they exhibit diminishing returns), the costs of bankruptcy,
and the impact of sharing on the probability of bankruptcy.” (Stiglitz, 2010, p.24)
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of the stock of public debt issued by the countries of the currency area.
Due to the increase in international risk aversion and the worsening of
macroeconomic conditions in the Periphery, the sovereign bond yields
of the these countries soared and the declining credibility of the Eu-
rozone caused also the Core countries to be contaged.
In section 2, we review the relevant literature on financial integra-
tion within the Eurozone, and provide empirical evidence on both the
evolution of the market sentiment and of the sovereign bond spreads
from the inception of the monetary union up to year 2012. In sec-
tion 3, by constructing a GVAR model where each country’s spread
depends upon all Eurozone countries’ spreads, we test to what extent
the international risk aversion interacted with worsening macroeco-
nomic fundamentals in the propagation of a contagion effect across
the Core’s and the Periphery’s sovereign spreads. Section 4 presents
our econometric results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Main facts and literature review
The completion of the monetary union with the adoption of the euro
accelerated integration across the EMU credit and capital markets
(Jappelli and Pagano, 2010). The end of the exchange rate risk and
a lowering international risk aversion were nourishing positive expec-
tations about the future of the Eurozone. As shown in Figure 1, all
sovereign spreads of the Eurozone, considering nil the interest rate on
the virtually risk-free German Bund functioning as the benchmark,
exhibited a fall. From the inception of the monetary union to the fi-
nancial crisis, the portfolios of European banks experienced a profound
reshuﬄing. Within the cross-border positions in assets and liabilities
of many banks of the Core countries, the sovereign bonds of Peripheral
countries disproportionately increased.
The mounting expectation of higher rates of return to be gained in
countries with relatively scarcer capital and lower per capita GDP was
a likely driver of the cross-country diversification process (Waysand et
al., 2010; Schmitz and von Hagen, 2011). As a consequence, between
January 1999 and August 2007, the average sovereign yield spreads
of the Peripheral countries against Germany was never larger than
15 basis points. Countries with high public debt relative to GDP
were more heavily penalised (Codogno et al., 2003; Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti, 2008; Balli et al., 2010). Table 1 documents the portfolio
3
Figure 1: Spreads path, 2000q1-2012q4
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diversification by the banks of each Core country towards the Periph-
ery’s financial assets. Large amounts of capitals of Core countries’
banks, invested in the Core at the inception of the monetary union,
moved to the financial markets of the Peripheral countries. Table 1
shows that the “lion’s share” of portfolio investments in the Periph-
ery was grasped by German and French banks, remarkably investing
capitals in the Greek financial assets until 2007, and returning them
back home during the crisis. The relative share of Periphery’s over
the overall Eurozone total owned by German banks rose from 1999
(36%) to 2003 (38%) to 2007 (50%), eventually dropping to 39% in
2012, and the relative share owned by French banks rose from 1999
(41%) to 2003 (44%) to 2007 (56%), eventually dropping to 38% in
2012. In absolute values (millions of US dollars, not reported in the
4
Table), the sole investment in Greek financial assets by German banks
rose from 27,673 in 2003 to 37,333 in 2007, falling to 24,605 in 2012,
while those in the hands of French banks rose from 9,924 in 2003 to
53,547 in 2007 and fell to 35,346 in 2012.
After the Lehmann collapse in September 2008, a drastic reversal
in the market sentiment occurred worldwide. The period of negligible
risk premia, started in 1999, was brought to an end by the transmis-
sion of a higher aversion to risk from the United States to Europe.
In European financial markets the international risk factor interacted
with worsening fiscal fundamentals (Attinasi et al., 2011). The fi-
nancial crisis compelled governments to put public money into the
European banks burdened by derivatives with declining market val-
ues. The financial support, or recapitalization funds, that banks re-
ceived from governments not only caused a relevant rise in their public
debt / GDP ratios, but also propelled a self-aggravating process. In
fact, the decreasing value of Peripheral countries’ sovereign bonds in
portfolios of highly leveraged banks contributed to deteriorate their
balance sheets of many Core countries’ banks (von Hagen et al., 2011;
Allen and Moessner, 2013)4. The more interconnected banks’ portfo-
lios were, the more a situation of illiquidity of a bank easily diffused
within the network of banks, the faster insolvency conditions spread
over (Tressel, 2010; Krause and Giansante, 2012). The probability
of a sovereign debt default also appeared to be linked to short-term
interest rates, a proxy related to the ability of a country to meet its
obligations (Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2009; Longstaff et al., 2011).
The greater the size of the banking sector in a country, as mea-
sured by the aggregate balance sheet to GDP ratio, the higher the risk
4The liquidity risk is a proxy for the relative size of markets among the variables used
in the literature in order to determine the spread as the probability that a limited depth of
the sovereign bond market could provoke heavy capital losses in case of early liquidation,..
In this paper, we waive this variable, as it does not appear to play any substantial role
in a majority of studies (Attinasi et al., 2011; Sgherri and Zoli, 2009; Barrios et al., 2009;
Haugh et al., 2009; and Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2009). The likely reason is that the
impact of liquidity risk on the spread is at least partly captured by the credit risk (Favero,
Pagano, and von Tadden, 2010). Also measures of country risk and the agencies’ rating
of sovereign bonds were inserted in regression models, with mixed results (Attinasi et
al., 2009; Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2011). Since the spreads feed-back on these two
variables, they cannot perform as independent variables contributing to the determination
of the spread as the dependent variable (De Grauwe and Ji, 2012).
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Table 1: Cross-border financial integration within the Eurozone: Positions
in Periphery’s financial assets held by the banks of five Core countries (Per-
centage of the total of each Peripheral country, various years)
1999 2003 2007 2012
Austria 23% 27% 35% 25%
Belgium 26% 33% 31% 36%
Finland 20% 15% n.a. n.a.
France 41% 44% 50% 38%
Germany 36% 38% 79% 39%
Netherlands 30% 34% 39% 22%
Total Core 34% 37% 46% 35%
Source: own computation on BIS statistical Annexes
Table 2: Cross-border financial integration within the Eurozone: Positions in
financial assets of six Core countries held by the Core’s and by the Periphery’s
banks (percentage of the total of each Core country’s financial assets, various
years)
1999 2003 2007 2012
core peri core peri core peri core peri
Austria 90% 10% 94% 6% 53% 47% 50% 50%
Belgium 89% 11% 88% 12% 86% 14% 98% 2%
Finland 95% 5% 84% 16% 86% 14% 94% 6%
France 82% 18% 78% 22% 78% 22% 78% 22%
Germany 81% 19% 62% 38% 47% 53% 58% 42%
Netherlands 90% 10% 93% 7% 87% 13% 86% 14%
Total Core 86% 14% 78% 22% 70% 30% 75% 25%
Source: own computation on BIS statistical Annexes
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that its public debt will soar as an effect of the government’s rescue
of distressed banks (Gerlach et al., 2010). The reciprocal distrust of
banks resulted in the collapse of the Eurozone’s inter-bank channel of
financing and caused a “sudden stop” in capital inflows to Peripheral
countries (Calvo, et al., 2008). Since the default risk premium on the
Periphery’s sovereign bonds rose, with the yields of the public debt
in the Core remaining constant, a divide opened between the widen-
ing spreads of the less advanced Peripheral countries and those of the
Core (Barrios et al., 2009). The forecasts by rating agencies and mar-
ket operators corrected the weight for the loss of fiscal sustainability of
Peripheral countries upwards (Sgherri and Zoli, 2009; Arghyrou and
Kontonikas, 2010). In some high-debt Peripheral countries the rise in
the spread appears to directly stem from the deterioration in fiscal
positions, holding international risk aversion constant (Haugh et al.,
2009). The interplay between rocketing public debt / GDP ratios, and
the plummeting value of sovereign assets unfolding insolvency condi-
tions across banks, caused the reversal of capital flows towards the
Core banks and the Periphery’ sovereign spreads vis-a`-vis Germany
widened (Caceres et al., 2010; Croci Angelini and Farina, 2012)5.
The larger the Core banks’ fall in confidence in a Peripheral coun-
try’s public debt, the more capital flows reverted to the “safe heaven”
of the German and other Core financial markets (Panetta, 2011).
Table 2 documents the variation in the share of financial assets of
Core countries respectively held by the banks of the Core and of the
Peripheral countries. The portfolios of Peripheral banks remarkably
widened as for the financial assets of Germany and France, and during
the crisis also as for the Austrian financial assets.
A dramatic upward trend of sovereign spread was exhibited from
2008 to 2012 first by Ireland, followed by Greece and Portugal, and
to a more limited extent by Spain and Italy, and eventually by the
Core countries but Germany, too (see Figure 1). Ranked from min to
max, - ranging from the minimum (0.65 points maximum spread in the
Netherlands in 2009.1) to the maximum (around 3000 points in Greece
in 2012.1) - in the third period all Core countries’ spreads precede
5The lack of confidence among banks about mutual creditworthiness, negatively affected
the liquidity transmission. A “sudden stop” due in the inter-bank refinancing channel
brought about a credit crunch and many EMU countries exhibited a negative GDP growth
in 2012. The fiscal sustainability of the “weak” member countries is also endangered by
the absence of a mutual guarantee on sovereign bonds and of the assignment of the LoLR
function to the ECB (De Grauwe and Ji, 2013).
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every Peripheral country’s spreads. The fact that the confidence in
the solvency of banks and governments abruptly fade away could be
traced back to the institutional weaknesses of the Eurozone, which
gave good reasons to financial markets for raising the risk premium
after a major shock6.
The scatter diagrams in Figure 2 portray the estimated fitting line
between the volatility of the international risk aversion (on the hor-
izontal axis) - proxied by the S&P index of the difference in yields
between corporate bonds and Treasury securities of similar maturity7
- and the spread (on the vertical axis) in each EMU country. Once
investors took accurate account of divergent macroeconomic perfor-
mances within the Eurozone, the Core’s and the Periphery’s sovereign
bonds yields entertain an idiosyncratic correlation with the evolution
of market sentiment. While the value on the horizontal axis is com-
mon to all countries’ diagrams, the spreads on the vertical axis widely
differ between Core and Periphery. It is apparent that the Core coun-
tries exhibit a positive correlation, while for the Peripheral countries
the correlation is nil.
The different market evaluation of the country-risk in the two ar-
eas of the Eurozone could have been influenced by the fact that the
banking crisis and the fiscal crisis were strictly interwoven, as a conse-
quence of the mutual exposure of banks and governments to the other
party’s insolvency risk. This liaison dangereuse could have been cru-
cial to the formation of a higher country-risk for the Peripheral coun-
tries, so that their sovereign bonds’ spreads rose much more than the
spreads on the Core sovereign bonds. The extensive evidence of pro-
nounced co-movements across Eurozone markets in 2008-09, mainly
in the form of correlated increases in the yields of government bonds,
should be taken as a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for
the outbreak of a systemic risk8. The presence of a systemic risk in
6In the Eurozone, public bonds are still issued by member states without either a
mutual risk insurance shielding countries from a recession or a common guarantee on debt
redemption. Furthermore, the ECB does not have the function of lender of last resort
(LoLR), its Statute forbids open market operations orientated to bailing-out a member
country, so that governments are not in the position to guarantee that the cash will always
be available to pay out bondholders at maturity (De Grauwe, 2011).
7As a proxy of international risk aversion we also used the United States stock market
volatility index (VIX); the correlation with the Eurozone spreads is very similar.
8Systemic risk consists in the “probability that cumulative losses will accrue from an
event that sets in motion a series of successive losses along a chain of institutions or
8
Figure 2: Spreads and Volatility
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a currency area, due to extensive cross-country linkages across finan-
cial markets, is typically detected after a large shock propagates as a
contagion across markets (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002).
Also the efficiency divide between the Core and the Periphery pro-
ductive systems has to be taken into account in dealing with the finan-
cial markets’ appraisal of fiscal sustainability in Peripheral countries.
After the launch of the Eurozone, the financial integration was ex-
pected to boost a faster catching-up in the per capita GDP growth
rates of Peripheral backward economies. Many investors perceived the
adoption of a single currency as a guarantee offered to the redemption
of the Eurozone countries’ public debt, also in the expectation that
markets comprising a system (. . . ). That is, systemic risk is the risk of a chain reaction
of falling interconnected dominos” (Kaufman, 1995, p. 47).
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a more sustained GDP growth would have improved public finances
in high-public-debt countries and put on a declining path their public
debt/GDP ratios. These premises were probably overstated. The hike
in the growth rate enjoyed by countries such Ireland and Spain, where
private investments largely exceeded private savings, were taken as
the windfall gain stemming from financial integration, while they were
mainly triggered by the moral hazard of speculative projects resulting
in housing and financial bubbles (Giavazzi and Spaventa, 2010).
Similarly, the wide current account imbalances vis-a`-vis the Core
countries, which soon opened in Peripheral countries due to the huge
rise of imported consumption goods, was viewed as a physiological
consequence of the higher GDP growth, triggered by more abundant
liquidity and much lower interest rates in countries with rates of in-
flation higher than the EMU average (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2002).
On the contrary, the main cause of the Peripheral countries’ trade
deficits was a declining competitiveness caused by upward trends of
their unit labour cost (ULC) vis-a`-vis the EMU-average, as a substan-
tial reduction of their intra-EMU exports started just after 1999. The
importance of the loss of the exchange rate policy instrument, previ-
ously often used by many Peripheral countries to counter a negative
shock, was greatly underestimated. The plummeting degree of com-
petitiveness hitting Peripheral countries contributed to the widening
of the spreads (Belke and Dreger, 2011). A likely explanation is that
an enduring fall in competitiveness is bound to reduce the growth
rate. This makes the perspective fiscal solvency of a country deterio-
rate, both due to the functioning of automatic stabilizers, which raises
public expenditures, and to the squeezing of fiscal revenues.
3 A model of contagion across sovereign
spreads
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) proposed to define contagion across fi-
nancial assets as a hike in cross-market correlation coefficients after
a shock to one country (or group of countries). Since during cri-
sis periods co-movements across markets are systematically observed,
evidence of a contagion can be validated only after controlling for
the upward bias in correlation coefficients due to market volatility.
This analytical framework nicely applies to the evolution of sovereign
spread across the Eurozone markets. Our model investigates whether
10
a contagion propagated by separating out the role played by the mar-
ket sentiment, as proxied by an index of volatility, from the possible
influence of worsening macroeconomic fundamentals.
The developments above summarized suggest to interpret the Eu-
rozone countries’ sovereign spreads as highly interconnected due to a
contagion across the risk of default of the member countries.
This interdependence among spreads has been recently proposed
by means of GVAR (Global Vector Autoregressive) models which make
each Eurozone country’s spread dependent on others Eurozone coun-
tries spreads. Favero (2013) models interdependence among risk pre-
mia on sovereign bonds exclusively as a contagion operating through
the time-varying “distance” between the Eurozone countries’ fiscal
fundamentals. The sole worsening in fiscal solvency after financial
crisis is then taken responsible for mutually reinforcing increases in
the spreads, signalling rising expectations of exchange rates’ depre-
ciation as an effect of one or more currencies exiting the Eurozone.
The problem with this appraisal of the Eurozone’s crisis is its lack of
consideration for the channels through which the worsening solvency
of governments transformed in varying expectations of default across
countries, finally affecting their spreads.
The dynamic of spreads is modelled as a partial adjustment around
a long run equilibrium level determined by market volatility, public
debt/GDP ratio, competitiveness, and Global Spread.
Following Favero (2013), we use the following specification:
∆(Y it − Y Gt ) = βi0 + βi1(Y it−1 − Y Gt−1) + βi2∆V OLt + βi3V OLt−1
+βi4(bit − bGt ) + βi5(reerit − reerGt )
+βi6(Y it−1 − Y Gt−1)E,b + uit
(Y it − Y Gt )E,b =
∑
j 6=i
wkji(Y
i
t − Y Gt )
wkji =
w∗ji∑
j 6=iw
∗
ji
, w∗ji =
1
distbj,i
distbji =
|bjt − bit|
60
where
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• Y it − Y Gt : spread between government bonds of country i and
Germany government bonds;
• V OL: volatility, S&P index of the difference in yields between
corporate bonds and Treasury securities of similar maturity;
• bit: debt to GDP ratio;
• reerit: Real Effective Exchange Rate
• (Y it − Y Gt )E,b = this term consist in a Global Variable designed
to capture a time-varying interdependence among spreads in the
euro area. This variable define for each country global spreads
which are weighted average of other countries spreads where
weights depend on the distance, measured in terms of differences
in debt to GDP ratio (bit), that separates Euro countries;
• i = 1, ..., 10 identifies the ten countries, while t indicates the
time, and u the error term.
We collected quarterly data from Datastream and our analysis
refers to the initial EMU membership plus Greece, except Luxem-
bourg.
The S&P Index of US stock volatility (VOL) is a proxy for the
“market sentiment”. Our hypothesis is that the boost to financial
integration created a network of European banks very interconnected
through the diversification in Peripheral countries’ sovereign bonds.
The excessive interconnection between banks of some countries and
sovereign bonds of other countries exposed the Eurozone to systemic
risk. We analyze whether, after the emergence of fiscal and com-
petitiveness distresses of Periphery countries, the worsening of mar-
ket sentiment affect yield spreads (of Core countries, in particular).
Once the perception of a systemic risk builds up, the complex network
connecting European banks could easily spread the fear of sovereign
bonds’ insolvency over EU countries, independently of their individ-
ual macroeconomic conditions. Moreover, the government debt to be
used as collateral was devalued. When uncertainty soars in worldwide
financial markets, investors drastically change their sentiment about
the European countries also because the public bonds they issue are
denominated in a currency over which they have no control, so that
their governments are not in a position to guarantee that the cash will
always be available to pay out bondholders at maturity. Furthermore,
financial operators take into account that the ECB is unable to act as
a LoLR, and is also constrained by the no-bail-out clause dictated by
12
its Statute. These institutional weaknesses of the EMU indicate that
the confidence in the solvency of banks and governments can abruptly
fade away, thus giving good reasons to financial markets for raising
the risk premium.
The public debt/GDP ratio and the real effective exchange rate
(REER) are the two variables conveying the influence of each coun-
try’s macroeconomic fundamentals on the propagation of the rise in
the risk premium on sovereign bonds. The path followed by the public
debt/GDP ratio represents the market evaluation of fiscal sustainabil-
ity of the country, that is the “credit risk”, the creditworthiness of the
country’s perspective public finances9.
Econometric evidence presented by Barrios et al. (2009) also shows
that in the presence of high risk aversion the spread for high public
debt countries always soars, independently of the government’s efforts
in fiscal retrenchment. In fact, the solo planning of surpluses in the
public budget of future periods could not be enough to reassure finan-
cial operators.
As to the other macroeconomic fundamental, a country’s REER
path deviating from the path followed by its most proximate market
competitors signals a competitiveness loss conveyed by real appre-
ciation10. A wage rate dynamics increasingly exceeding the labour
productivity dynamics warns of a likely reduction in net exports. If
a country suffers from a severe loss of competitiveness, so that the
reversal of the current account imbalance is in doubt, and if foreign
investors are no longer willing to invest in the country and the resi-
dents are unable to sell their foreign assets, banks’ liabilities and/or
public debt will increase.
A market adjustment is then needed through a reduction of prices
and wages in the high-public-debt countries, but market operators
could be afraid of a prolonged deflation negatively impinging upon
the fiscal revenues needed for the fiscal retrenchment. Hence, the
steeper the rising path followed by the REER, the larger will be the
9For the reasons exposed in the previous section, we decided to waive the “liquidity
risk” and focus on the “credit risk”.
10The tight connections between the REER and the current account suggest verifying
whether our estimates would improve by considering this latter variable too, which not
only reflects competitiveness but also the influence of the level of domestic demand on
the country’s imports. The replacement of the REER with the current account is not
satisfactory, as this variable turns out to be less significant than the REER. In addition,
when both variables are included the current account coefficient becomes insignificant.
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risk premium imposed by financial markets.
As stated before, the increasing financial integration makes nec-
essary to consider the exposure of each country’s spread to the other
spreads in the euro area. Our Global Spread variable is built up by
a weighted average of the yield spreads in EU countries. The weights
are time-varying, related to changes of fiscal fundamentals, and make
global spread more dependent on the spreads of those countries that
are more similar in terms of fiscal fundamentals. The global variables
is included through their lags. Including the contemporaneous global
variables would be problematic, because these variables are unlikely to
be exogenous (Pesaran et al., 2004). In our model, the conditions for
exogeneity are likely to be violated, and the contemporaneous global
spreads will be endogenous for the estimation of the parameters.
Estimation of the GVAR panel model is implemented by a GLS
panel, including country fixed effects. The method allows for het-
eroskedastic and correlated error structure and, furthermore, uses a
panel-specific ar(1) autocorrelation structure. We made these choices
after the appropriate tests.
4 Results
Table 3 shows the effects on spreads of market sentiments (volatility),
fiscal fundamentals (public debt), competitiveness (reer) and Global
Spreads. The model has been estimated over the euro regime for the
sample 2000m1-2012m6, and includes the subprime crisis. Table 4 re-
ports the same analysis, by separating months characterized by “high”
spreads (average monthly spread over the median value of the period
2000-2012), by periods of ”low” spreads (average monthly spread un-
der the median value).
In table 3, the Periphery (1) estimate shows that the (high) spread
of periphery countries actually depend on fiscal fundamentals and
competitiveness, and do not depend on market sentiments. Core es-
timations (1) and (2) highlight that, in the period 2000-2012, the
spreads of Core countries have been negatively influenced by market
sentiments, while they were by no means affected by competitiveness
and fiscal fundamentals.
The rise in the volatility was reflected by the Core countries’ spreads
only during the period of high spreads prompting the “flight to qual-
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Table 3: Spreads on Bunds, monthly data, 2000m1-2012m6
panel panel panel
all countries core periphery
(Y it−1 − Y Gt−1) 0.019∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗
(0.007) (0.016) (0.009)
V OLt−1 0.001 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
∆V OLt 0.001∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
(bit − bGt ) 0.001∗∗ 0.000 0.004∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
(reerit − reerGt ) 0.002∗∗ 0.000 0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
(Y it−1 − Y Gt−1)E,b -0.005 0.016∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.008)
Wald χ2 51.57 34.90 64.65
p > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
n 1390 695 695
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Country fixed effects
ity”, thus indicating that the contagion consists in the fact that has
essentially been triggered by the perception of a growing systemic risk.
While the spreads of Core Countries are affected by systemic risk
and do not depend on fiscal fundamentals (b) and competitiveness
(reer), growing volatility seems to not hit the spreads of Periphery
Countries. On the contrary, the Periphery spreads increased as an
effect of the worsening of public debt/GDP ratios and of the REER
as the indicator of competitiveness (both in the high and the low
volatility periods, as stated by table 4.
In presence of an increasing of spreads, both of Periphery Coun-
tries because of b and reer trends, and of Core Countries because
of increasing volatility (V OL, contagion), the Global Spread variable
raises for all countries.
The results about the increasing of Global Spread presented in
Table 3 deserve a deepening, because it seems to have positive (not
significant) consequences over spreads (it determines lower spreads)
in first column’s estimates. As the Global Spread widens, the spread
15
Table 4: Spreads on Bunds, monthly data, 2000m1-2012m6
panel panel panel panel panel panel
all countries all countries core core periphery periphery
low spreads high spreads low spreads high spreads low spreads high spreads
(Y it−1 − Y Gt−1) -0.241∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.268∗∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗ -0.243∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.023) (0.011) (0.036) (0.026) (0.034) (0.015)
V OLt−1 0.000 0.000 0.001∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003)
∆V OLt 0.000 0.003∗∗ 0.000 0.003∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004)
(bit − bGt ) 0.0004∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.000 0.001 0.008∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003)
(reerit − reerGt ) 0.0004∗ 0.003∗ 0.000 0.000 0.001∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004)
(Y it−1 − Y Gt−1)E,b 0.088∗∗∗ -0.004 0.028 0.021∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗
(0.023) (0.006) (0.038) (0.007) (0.037) (0.014)
Wald χ2 116.03 41.84 60.33 26.58 57.76 47.39
p > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
n 740 650 370 325 125 325
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Country fixed effects
in the estimates of the first column of Table 3 reduces. Yet, an in-
crease of the Global Spread causes opposite effects on spreads if Core
or Periphery are separately considered, as shown by the Core and Pe-
riphery estimates. Core countries seem to suffer negative effects from
the global movements of spreads in EU area, while Periphery countries
even benefit from it.
Table 5 presents estimates for two different periods: before and
after the second quarter of 2007, taken as the beginning of crisis end
raising spreads (Figure 1). Until the beginning of the crisis, spreads are
stables. From the middle of 2007, spreads of Periphery countries rise
because of higher debt to GDP ratio and lower competitiveness, while
spreads of Core countries suffer the worsening of market sentiments
(V OL, systemic risk). The positive relation between the S&P index
of volatility and spreads of Core countries, in presence of a worsening
in competitiveness and fiscal fundamentals of Periphery countries, is
an evidence of a contagion driven by shifts in market sentiment. The
grow of spreads turns out in an increase of Global Spread variable
for all countries, with opposite consequences on Periphery and Core,
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because it generates expectations of institutional actions (i.e. help
for periphery countries) with opposite consequences for government
budgets of Periphery and Core countries, as discussed above.
5 Concluding remarks
Data drawn from banks’ portfolios show that the launch of the mon-
etary union prompted a rapid financial integration, which resulted in
excess exposure of Core countries’ banks in the Periphery’s financial
assets. Empirical evidence indicates that almost flat paths of sovereign
bonds’ yields were upward moved by the financial crisis, with the
Periphery’s sovereign bonds exhibiting disproportionate increases of
sovereign bonds’ spreads with respect to the 10 year German Bund..
The contribution of this paper to the literature on the crisis of the
Eurozone consists in the application of the GVAR methodology to de-
tect a contagion effect within the Eurozone. Estimates conducted by
our GVAR model, where each country’s spread depends upon all Eu-
rozone countries’ spreads, indicate that the huge rise in the sovereign
yields of Peripheral countries is correlated to their macroeconomic
fundamentals, namely the public debt/GDP ratio and REER values
increasing with respect to the Eurozone average index, whereas the
rise in the Core countries’ spreads was initially determined by the ris-
ing international risk aversion. The fall in the solvency conditions of
the Periphery’s public debt not only created the upward trend in those
countries’ spreads but also magnified the impact of the deteriorating
market sentiment on the Core’ sovereign bonds, negatively impinging
on their spreads as well. The rise of the Core spreads can be traced
back to mounting expectations in the markets of an enduring financial
instability within the Eurozone, associated with possible defaults in
the Periphery.
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